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Summary findings
Chandavarkar  analyzes the distinctive features of formal  Most developing countries do not have a national
and informal  financing of infrastructure  and  the principal  infrastructure  agency to fund and coordinate  technical
issues policymakers  must address in dealing with  assistance for infrastructure  projects. Chandavarkar
infrastructure  finance: its adequacy in competitive  makes a case for an apex financial entity in charge of
financial sysrems, its budgetary  vulnerability, the  municipal financial intermediaries  for infrastructure,
rationale  for foreign finance, the role of user charges and  pointing  to the instructive experience  of intermediaries
taxes, the pros and  cons of earmarking taxes, the  in Colombia  and Jordan.  One responsibility of such an
institutional  framework  for infrastructure  firnance,  the  agency would  be to determine  the necessary import
role of municipal finance, different approaches  to the  content  (for equipment, technical, and managerial
private financing of infrastructure  (such as franchises,  expertise) of infrastructure  finance, to prevent
leases, management  contracts, and  consumer  overborrowing.
cooperarives), the critical role of contractor  finance, and  - Privatization  of infrastructure  should be viewed as
informal financing of infrastructure.  implicit earmarking,  but official regulation  of public
Chandavarkar  concludes,  among other things, that:  utility prices should al'ow private utilities to generate
- Not  only the amount  of funds but the regularity  of  retained  earnings (to encourage self-financing) and
their  flow is centra! to maintaining infrastructure.  But  should allow adjustments for inflatiern  and exchange rate
infrastruccure must  compete on a level playing field wirh  fluctuations.
other sectors. Any essential (but not open-ended)  - Infrastructure  policy should allow for cost recovery
subsidies for maintaining  universal minimum standards  through  user charges as well as for tax revenues,
of service are best carried  on the government budget,  especially through  municipal taxes, since even the
subject to periodic review.  viability of loan  finance depends on an efficient tax
- Institutional  reform  is needed to rationalize  the  effort.
division of resources and  responsibilities among all layers  - While infrastructure  finance  is important,  it is not
of government and  to provide mechanisms for insulating  always the decisive constraint,  judging from the
infrastructure  finance  from budgetary and  other  operating  losses of even adequately  funded infrastructure
pressures. Such mechanisms include earmarking,  projects.
privatization,  and objective criteria for sharing value-
added tax and  other national  tax revenue.
This paper - a product of the Office  of the Vice President, Development Economics  - is one in a series of background papers
prepared forWorldDevelopmentReport 1994 on infrastructure. Copies of the paper are available  free from theWorld Bank, 1818
H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Michael Geller, room 17-079, extension 31393 (38 pages).  November
1994.
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This paper discusses the key principal issues concerning the financing of economic
infrastucture-trasport,  telecommunications,  water, waste disposal, power, gas, electricity-in
the developing  countries and suggests an appropnate institutional  and policy framework in light
of the disdnctive features of infrastucture  finance and the available empirical evidence.
The paper identifies  the distinctive characteistics of infirastructure  finance and addresses
fte  principal  issues  and  challengca facing  infrastructure  finance,  notably  the  budgetary
vulnerability of  infrastructure finance and  the  financing of  new  investment and  adequate
maintenance in  increasingly competitive and  lieralized  financial  systems.  Given  the
heterogeneity  of infrastructure  finance, the analysis  prceeds  to disagg  the different sources
and techniques  of infrastructure finance-formal and infonal,  ;ublic and private, domestic  and
foreign-and  concludes with an agenda for policies and reforms.
The question: "Why  does finance matter?" has been extensively  discussed  in the literature
which shows a growing consensus that it is a necessary even if not a sufficet  condition for
adequate levels of  investment and  growth (World Development Report:  1989, Chap 2).
Nevertheless, this poses the related question: If finance is fungible, what in fact is the relevance
and significance of secoral  finance, of which infa  e  finance is a major subset.  This
paper argues that infrastructure finance is sufficiently distnctive to ment specidal  attention and
analysis.
Infrastructure services differ substantially  in their economic charactistics  between and
nthmin  sectors and technologies. Infrastructure  output is generally  non-exportable  except in some2
cases (e.g.  natural gas,  electricity).  Infrastructure investment is invariably location-or-site
specific and also jurisdiction specific (for example, national, provincial, regional, or municipal).
The  economic and  technical features of  infrastrcture,  coupled with  the  compulsions of
tradional  public finance, are reflected in infrasuctu  finance, which consequently  marls  it
off from other types of institutional and corporate finance.  The more distinctive aspects of
infrastructre  finance are as follows:
*  Capital costs are large relative to mainance  and operating costs because of
lage,  lumpy equipment  and extensive delivery networks.
*  There are substantal sunk costs because a high proportion of total costs has to be
irrevocably committed up-front before a project becomes operational.
T  resultant high costs of entry and exit reduce the competitiveness  and hence
contestabiiy  of infrastructure serces.
D  The combination of high capital and sunk costs, long periods of gestation and
pay-off, often with irregular revenue flows, leads to longer debt matities  and
high average debt-equity ratios.
These features combine to make infrastructure investments potentially high-risk ventures, with
the  implcatin,  not  always justified,  that  such  risks  are  most  efficiently bone  by  the
government,  which can spread them over the entire population. But both technical and financial
innovations are allowing ivestments  to become less lumpy and are reducing the isk element
through greater  modularity in  infrastructure construction and more efficient means of  risk
allocation and management through inceasingly  sophisticated capital and insurance markets.3
For instance,  leasing  of plant and equipment  offers  entrepreneurs  greater  possibilities  of exit if
a project  does not yield  expected  returns. But financial  innovation,  per se, is no assurance  or
index of whether  it confers  net benefits  by generating  externalities,  reducing  infonnation  and
transacdon  costs, and enhancing  the additionality  of finance. Interestingly,  while domestic
infrastructe  finance  has been generally  conventional,  cross-border  infrastructure  finance  has
spawned  a bewildering  variety  of instruments  (nearly  sixty  types),  which  are variants  and hybrids
of bonds,  commercial  paper, warrants,  preferred  stock, and miscellaneous  types  (for example,
asset-backed  securities)  as weil as representing  varied combinations  of yields, maturities,  and
currencies  (Peter  NeviLt,  1989). The  resultant  complexity  of arangements  suggests  that forign
f=nancing  of infrastructure  is tending  to be increasingly  project  specifi.
The empirical  evidence  shows  that typically  infastucture  firms (trucking,  tlphone,
electric and gas utlites,  airlines)  have high leverage (debt-equity)  rafios (Harris and Raviv
1991). LIkwise, since  public  utlities operate  under  regulatory  rgme  thee is little  retention
of eanings over and above thi  capital  consumption  allowances. Consequently,  they tend to
borrow flmds for their expansion. This also suggests tht the "peckdng  orde  of corporate
fnance," in which retined earings are used in prefece  to debt issues  and debt is used in
prefern:ce to external  new equity  issues  is not typical  of infrastruc  finance  (Myers  1984).
Generally,  publicly taded equity is not well-suited  for finance of individual  risky projects
because  of difficulties  of conveyig infmation  about the natre  of nsks to  older  and
about  the progress  in controlling  the rsks.  An extreme  example  of this  is the virtualy elusive
role of debt finance  in the Euro-nnel project  (£ 7 billion  out of the ttal  capital  of £ 8 billion).
In a apidly  expanding  market,  a firm will  have  investment  oppotunities  that  are likely  to exceed4
its capaity  for geneating internal funds, and, other things being equal, a frm  with large capital
assets and steady earings  will find it easier to raise funds extermally. This explains why, for
instance, electric utlities tend to be very highly geared (IFC 1991, p. 11).
In sum, infrastructure finance is clearly differentiated from non-infrastructurc finance.
On thfe  other hand, it is not a homogenous entity.  Consequently it has to be appropriately
disaggregated  by: origin (foreign  and domestic); sectors (public, private and joint); by techniques
and instruments of  finance; and by type of finance, i.e.  new investment,  tenance,  and
worldng capital.  It  is,  herefore, best c  as  a portmanteau concept embodying
diffent  elemtents  and characteistics.
Issues and Challenges  of Infrastructure Finance
Iastructure  finance has to provide for both a6ditions to the capital stock (net long-life
investment) and the  maintance  and qualitative improvement of  the existing stock.  The
esimates for (a 1 percent increase in GNP is associated  with 1 percent increase in inuctre
stock) for fte  WDR 1994 underscore the closeness of the relationship between infrastruct
investment and economic growth.  But the main issues of infratructure  finance relate not only
to the adequacy of funding but even more to the timeliness  and regularity of the flow of funds
without which essential maintance,  so vital for  sustinable  development, is  lielly  to  be
jeopardized.  A critical part of infrastructure expenditure has an incremental and ongoing
character because of the requrents  of maintenance. The financing of maince  is often
limited (even exUrnally financed projects have litle  provision for maintenance) and higy
eatic  being among the earliest items to be cut or dropped in the event of budgetaqr pressur5
In many sub-sectors  of infrastuctre  depreciation  does not occur on a linear trajectory  which
consequently  necessitates  adequate  proviion for  contingency  finance There  is also  the difficult
and complex  issue  of how  much  of the financing  gap  represents  a genuine  resource  gap and how
much of  it is  a reflection of  inefficiency  of existing infrastructure.  To the extent that
infrastructue prices are held below  cost with the help of large subsidies,  these  add to the cost
of local and national  taxation  and make  it more difficult  to achieve  overall  fiscal  balance.
Paradoically, despite  their recogniized  importance,  infrastructure  outlays  are fte most
vulnerable  to cuts in government  budgets  during  periods  of adjustment  and fiscal  austity  in
both developed  and developing  countries. A most noticeable  trend during the 1980s  when  a
number  of developing  countries  were implementing  adjustment  programs  was the sharp  cut in
capital  expenditure  (mostly  infiastrucu)  as a percentage  of both GDP and total expenditure
(Sanjay  Pradhan  and Vimay  Swaroop  1993,  p 29). Lilkwise, the reduction  in Bxitain's  budget
deficits  in the 1980s  was due largely  to cuts  in net investment. CfIh  Economist,  September  4,
1993,  p. 52).  There  is systematic  evidence  for the U.S. that capital  spending  is, in fact, the
most vulnerable  budgtt hen  under fiscal pressure (George  Peuson  1984, p.  122).  Since
infrastruct  is the  most substantial  component  of capital  expenditure  it bears  a disproortionate
and unwarranted  burden  of budgetary  economies  and impairs  sustinable development  because
cuts  in essential  maintenanc tend to stretch  into indefinite  neglect  and become  more  expensve
in the long run as in the case of roads  in Afiica  (Mason and Thriscutt 1989,  p.30).  All this
reflect the famili  political  problem  that governments  and politicians  find  it so much  easier  to
cut capital  as against  current  expenditure.  The deferment  or cancellation  of a capital-intensive
infrastructure  project  is politically  a softer  option  than the reduction  of social  sector  outlays  and6
laying off of government employees, and even the populist pressures of log-rolling and  pork
barrls  do not seem to avail against inftastructure retechment-a  paradox not yet resolved by
public choice economics.
Since  public  finance  is  still  a  major  resource  for  infrastructure,the  budgetary
vulnerability  of infrastructure finance poses critical issues for public policy.  All these concerns
have to be addressed in the light of the special characteristics of infrastructure finance, whichi
will have to compete on equal terms with non-infrastucture finance on a level playing field in
increasingly  competive  and liberalized financial systems.
Sources and Techniques of Infrastructure Finance
Role and Prspect  of Foreign Finance: Genuine or Excess Recourse?
What is the real role of external finance, whether grants, loans or equity, in financing
domestic infrastuctur?  This  question  merits exminaton  pimarily  because  the  ready
availability  of foreign funds undl recenty froin donors and interational  agencies has obscured
the real role of foreign exchange in the finance of infrastructure projects.  Governments have
reLied  in varyg  degrees  on foreign financing  for infrastructure and offiial  development  finance
has icreased  steadily  and in recent years has accounted  on average for about $24 billion a year,
or  12 percent of total  infrastructure finance (WDR,  1994, Chapter 5).  But there are  no
systmatic estimates of the relative distribution  of the finance of infrastructure between domestic
and foreign sources.  The fragmentary  evidence suggests a surprisingly high foreig  exchange7
component  (about  halt) for maintenance  of roads  in Sub-Saharan  Africa  and extrnal assistance
would need to cover not only foreign  costs but over 60 percent of local cost  Mason and
Thriscutt, 1989). Road maintenance  is normally  a labor-intensive  activity  which  relies largely
on local material  and as such  should  not warrant  such  disproportionately  large  foreign  exchange
inputs. It reflects,  among  others, over-reliance  on capital-intensive  techniques  whereas  greater
use of  labor-intensive  techniques  could perhaps have been more economical  of  foreign
exchange.' However,  labor-intensive  techniques  may not always  and necessarily  represent  the
cost  miniming option  in terms  of economizing  on foreign  exchange.  The choice  of techniques
thus  depends  on a combination  of circumstances.  For  instance,  the appropriate  techniques  is also
'very  senitive to topographic  conditions.
Infrastructure  usually  has  a fairly  significant  but varying  import-content,  which  poses  the
cintical  issue:  Does the foreign  exchange  component  of infrastructure  finance its essential
import-content  or does it also cover local currecy  costs which cannot be met because  of
undeveloped  domestic  capital  markets. Or does it amount  to  excess  borrowing"  defined as
ufmrpf  of capital which arise otherwise  than in connecton with a need to finance such  supplies
of goods  and services  from abroad  as are, in a given state  of tastes,  techniques  and available
resources  and of a given  amount  and composition  of output  and growth,  both  i=sablead
unritabk  (emphasis  provided),  (J. Knapp  1957,  p. 432). For instance,  it has been argued
that the foreign boirowing of  the Unied  States in the nineteenth  century was really a
mnifestation of  excess borrowing in  the sense that it  was largely a  reflection of  the
MmThe  expeence of the  Oxungi  Pilot  Project  in KLacdi  is nmt inshrctive. On.re  st  of informl local
financing  w-  to lower cosa of manholes  for undergrond  wge  lines to  ot  POO  conWared  to
Rs2300 i  si  mlar waby UNtUlW-_  d prject,  cid  Wid,  1994,  page 6.8
underdeveloped  state of her domestic  capital  market  rather than her inability  to match current
domestic  investment  by current  savings;  it was "nothing  much more than a costly  process  of
satisfying  her preference  for liquidity"  (Ibid,  p.434). This amounts  to a judgment  that domestic
savers preferred  liquid  assets (cash balances)  to bond and equities. Other similar cases, are
Burma,  India, Indonesia,  the Gold Coast (Ghana)  and Nigeria  (Ea.  Myint 1953,  p. 138). The
external borrowings  for Indian railways  in the nineteenth  and early twentieth  century also
represented  excess  borrowing  since they  were not  justified  by the strict  criteria  of finaning the
essential import-content  of investment  that could not be supplied by domestic  resources.
Arguably,  a good part of infrastructure  invesmt  in the post-World  War II period may well
have represented  excess foreign  exchange  funding.  In addition to the imperfections  of the
domestic capital market, recourse to extemal finance often reflects the macroecononmc
constraints  on public sector saving as in the Dominican  Republic which is one of several
counties with a high reliance  on foreign funding  (around  70-80 percent) for infrastructure
investments  in 1991  (WDR  1994,  p.90).
Of course, one could  question  the concept  of "excess  borrowing"  on the ground  that it
is quite normal  for indeed  al  capital-importing  countries  to fil  the saving-investment  gap by
exteWrl capital  inflows, which if used productively,  could service the debt out of growing
income  and maintain  external  balance  by movement  of resources  into  exportable  goods. The  real
criterion  then  is whether  the end-use  of foreign  finance  has been  sufficiently  productive  to yield
a positive rate of retun.  Nevertheless,  it is pertinet  to ask whether foreg  exchange  is
necessary  to meet local currency costs of infrastuctre,  in addition  to the essental import-
content of infrastructure  (for example,  equipment,  technology  and exprise).  For instance,  if9
the domestic  supply  of wage  goods  consumed  by workers  is inelastic,  there may  be a good  case
for financing  these  as well  from  foreign  exchange  if there  is limited  capacity  to restrain  domestic
absorption  and to mobilize  additional  domestic  saving.  In some other cases, "it may be
necessary  to raise the reward of domestic  fictors wherever  investigation  suggests  that their
contribution  may  have  been  undervalued  previously'  (Drake,  1972,  p. 962).
Currently,  there  is a great  variety  of foreign  financing  techniques  for  infrstructure, most
of which  seem  to involve  an elcemnt  of goverment guarantee.  They  are, however,  exceedingly
complex, and time-consuming  sometimes  beyond the negotiating  capabilities  of  the host
govemment  (e.g. Build, Operate  and Transfer  (DOI) and Build, Operate  and Own (BOO)
proects).  As there has been  hardly  any systmatic testing  of the additionality  hypothesis,  it is
difficult  to maintain  categorically  whether  BOTs  add to net extenal finance. Arguably,  if
countries  can  implement  the same  project  in tried  ways  such  as borrowings  for a turny  proect
that might be a  moxe viable option (Marks  Augenblick  and B. Scott Custer Jr,  1990).
Nevertheless,  the fact  remains  that many  projects  considered  essential  could  not be built  without
DOT financing  schemes  because  governments  do not have the budgetary  resources or the
borrowing  capacity  to build.  A good example  is the investment  in power projects  in The
Philippines,  where  the governent has  also enacted  compiehensive  legiation to facilitate OT
infstructure pnjects.  The  potential  of BOT  projects  is, however,  promising. For instance,
the  3ast  Asia and Pacific  Rim, which  has 130 projects  in the pipeline  at an estimated  $114
billion,  is expected  to be ultimately  the biggest  user of BOT, with Malaysia  possibly  as the
biggest  user  on a per capita  basis.  her lower-  and middle-income  countries  with a high  per
capita  funding  of hOT prcdects  are Argentina,  Belize,  Hong  Kong,  and Panama.10
But in all infrastructure  projects. whether  BOT &  othes,  the host government  or its
agent (e.g. the Central  Bank) must be able and willing  to provide some mechanism  to assure
foreign investors that they will be authorized to convert local cmTency  eamings into foreign
currency  as and when  required  and that the  rate will not be unduly  adverse. There  are a variety
of mechanisms  to co'er  foreign  exdcange  risk for the investors  but they all involve official
agencies  for suppirt, such  as an exchange  risk insurance  scheme  operated  by a central  bank with
the premium  being  an additional  cost  of financing  or escrow  accounts  as in the case  of the HIUB
river project  in Pakistan. Alteratively, governments  can adjust  user tffs  for exchange  rate
movements. In Turkey  for the Gazi  project,  the govenment proposed  that its power  authority
would  make  ils periodic  payments  under  the off-take  contrat in a basket  of cu:rencies  designed
to match the payment  required  to be made  to foreign  investors  and lenders,. IE Malaysia,  the
government  has provided,  a 17-year  eternal  risk guarantee  for the North-South  expressway
project  to cover increased  costs  from adverse  foreign  exchange  and interest  rate movements  on
foreign  loans  for the project.
Any evaluation  of the position  and prospect of foreign  capital  flows  into infastructr
has to be based on the ovefall  trends  in foreig  investment  in the developing  countries  which
show an explosion  in intemational  flows of private  capital  to develpmg counties from $35
billion (1990) to $112 billion (1993 estimated)  (World  Bank 1993, pp.10, 21).  Although
separte  figures for infrAstructure  investmc  at are not available, infructure  has been a
significant  beneficary of such flows  (WDR, 1994,  Box  5.2).
Although  the 2ggregate  foreign financing  of infrastrncture  privatization  (198S-1992)
represented  a substantal portion of total financing  this was laigely accounted  for by Latin11
America  and the Caribbean. Among  the other regions,  foreign  financing  has been  negligible  in
East and South  Asia and virtually  non-existent  in Sub-Saharan  Africa. The only region  where
foreign financing  of privatization  has been predominant  is Eastern Europe and Central Asia
which is explained  by the special strategic  and other interests  of the investor  countries. But
foreign  financing  of infrastructure  pnvatzation is a once-over  source  of finance  and it is no
index of recurring  availability.
The  prime  incentive  for  foreign  capital  investment  is a credible  and stable  macroeconomic
and regulatory  environment,  coupled  with  strong  commitments  to growth,  as exemplified  by the
experience  of Argentina,  Chile and Mexico.  The World  Bank isues guarantees  for projet
fnance under  the Extended  Co-financing  Facility  (ECO)  to cover sovereign  risk assoiated with
the infrastructure  projects,  as in the case of the fub  River Project  in Pakistan  and a thermal
power project in China.  The services  of the Multilateral  Investment  Guarantee  Assocation
(MIGA)  (1988)  inproviding  long-trm investmet insurance  uaantees)  againstnon-comnercial
risks (e.g. cunrency  transfer,  exppriation,  breach  of contract,  and war and civil distrbances)
too are an added safeguard  for foreign  private direct investment  in infrastuctr.  Several
factors are mutually  reinforcng in creating  a congenial  climate  for forei  investment  such  as
substantial  returns (especally from telecommunicatons  and electric utlities), rising market
shares for infrastructure  companies  and growing  investor  confidence. A noteworthy  feare  is
the fact that  infrastructure  equites have  out performed  other  stocks  by a huge  margin  since 1985
nternational  Finance  Corporation,  1993).
But even given the optimal  availability  of foreign finance the bulk of financing  for
infrastructure  finance  will  have  to be from domestic  sources. wEven  if a country  has  an effective12
macroeconomic  adjustment program, and  the  macroeconomic  variables are  showing
improvement,  there are times when  it cannot  count on the intemational  capital  markets  as
sources of new funds. 3 (John Shilling,  1992, p.106).  The key question  then is whetier
infastructure  in developing  countnes  can access  an adequate  amount  of foreign  resources  to
finance  its essential  import-content  of equipment, technology  and expetise.
Domestic  Finance of Infrastructure*  Public F;inanc
Even though the share of pnvately financed infrastructure  is rsing,  government will
continue  to be a significant  source  of financing,  eithe singly  or in partnership  with private
enterprise. There are, however,  no a priori criteria  for the opfimal  distribution  of finance
between  the  public  and private  sectors  or between  different  techniques  of finance  within  the two
sectors.-  The  principal  issues  in the  domestic  fnancing  of infrastructure  relate  to: the distribution
of finance  between  the public  and  private  sectors  as well  as  joit  financings,  the role of informal
finance  and the approprate techniques  of financing  such as; taes,loans, user fees, leases,
management  contracts,  fanchises, etc.
Infrastrure  finance  is, however,  unique  in being  subject  to different  forms  of product
pnce regulation  whose  central  concen is to regulate  the uiit price which consumers  pay for
infrastucturerices  such  as electricity  and telephone  services. Regulaton  may  also ivolve
rate of reun  xegulation  with Little  or no pricing flexibility  and/or price caps (as in the
telecommunications  industries)  which  stipulate  that the prices  charged  must not exceed  a pre-
specified  level.  Such regulations  affect the profitability  and capacity  for sOlf-finang  of13
infstructure enteprises. It is noteworthy  tat  even  a pristine  laissez  faire  economy  like  Hbng
Kong  has found  it necessary  to have  recourse  to rate of return  regulations  on public  utilities.
There  is a variety  of instruments  for infrasucue  finance  such  as: user charges,  taxe
(general  and earmarked),  loans,  fianchises,  concesons, leases  management  contacts, etc., but
in the long  run, there  are only two  choices  as to who will  finance  infrastrucre: the users  or tax
payers in geneal.  A useful guideline  is that wherever  feasible  user-cost  pricing should  be
exploited  to finance  infrastucture  investment  as a primary  source. Such pricing  can match
financing  with effective  demand, ensure a steady source of revenue  for menance  and
imEprovements  and recover  costs from those  who beefit from the use of infrase.  User
tmriffs  also led  themselves  to 'fine-tuning'  to reflect  differential  demand  factors  like  peak  and
off-peak  loads  and congestion  pricing.
There are  several attrive  and  feasible variants of  earmarked user-fnanced
infrastrucre such  as the system  of 'Walorztion' in Colombia  which  is a levy of a beUerment
tax on  propery  at has  benefited  from  construction  of local  public  works;  the cost  of the public
works  is allotted  to affected  properties  in proportion  to the estimated  benefits. Valorzation
represents one of the purest forms of eannarking since it is based on linkage of desirable
proects to raise financing  from prospective  beneficiaries,  which also offers  a mechanism  to
overcome  resistance to taxes. In prace,  as the Colombian  exeience  shows, collection  of the
valorization tax has encountered  problems such as  defining the  'zone  of influence"  of the
projects  and thus  identifying  benefciaries. Generous  exemptions  too have  eoded the tax  base.
The  collection  and  administative  deficiencies  also  resulted  in  unstable  revenues,  largely  negating
the other prospective  advantages  of eannarkig.  In Korea, the 'land readjustment'  program14
provides  fcr up-front  development  of large parcels of land by the local govemment,  parts of
which are sold  to the prvate sector  at market  pncLc..
Tm=  andafrzmF
There  is often  a convincing  ca  for financing  inf  services  through  taxes  when:
a)  the administatve costs  of these  revenues  are lower  than  for direct
user charges;
b)  the incidence  of  taxes falls  on the beneficiaries  of theinfrastctre
servics  as in the case of taxes on veicles  and fuel (a pardtal
pry  for road user charges).
On the other  hand, tax financing  may  not  be desrable  if it affects  adversely  the incentives
for efficient  allocation  of resources,  as, for instance,  when  all farmers  are taxed  on their  output
prces  ahr  tan  made  to pay ecoonmic  prces for their  iputs  (e.g. irgation  water,  electricty,
frtilizers).  In some  cases,  the removal  of operating  subsidies  as in the canal  irrigation  systems
of the Philippine  National  Irgtion  Administation  heed  to reduce  staffing  levels  and  opating
eses  while  holding  the fee-based  iigation  income  constant.  (Svendsen,  1993,  p.989).  It
is noteworthy  too that in the Philippines  concurret changes  in opuating rules and procedures
led to an increase  in iigated  area and improved  equity  of water distribution. The observed
impovement in the overall  performance  of the irrigation  system  is regarded  as a consequence
of the shift to complete  financial  autonomy.15
Iearlrng  of taxes and loans for infrastructure  desirable?
A major  issue  in public  finance  is the  desirability  of earmarking  for infrastructure  finance
in view of the budgetary  vulnerability  of infrastructure  finance. "Earark:ing" refers to the
budgetary  practice  of assgning revenues, from specfic taxes or groups of ta  to specific
government  expenditures  which  may  also  be supplemented  by revenue  from  other  sources. This
practice  is contrasted  with general  fund financing  whereby  expenditures  are financed from a
consolidated  fund. While  normally  eannarking  refers to the assgnment  of a single  tax source
to a single  end-use  (e.g. fuel taxes and motor  vehicles  fees for highway  investments)  within  a
multi-tax  and mult-fiscal  jurisdiction,  the identical effects  are replicated  by the creatin  of
special purpose fiscal units for infrstructre  services such as; school, santation, or fire districts
(as in the U.S.) each of which  is granted  independent  but specific  and restricted  taxing  power.
Earmarking  is an application  of the benefit  principle  of taxation  in so far as the beneficiaries
of specific  government  expenditures  or activities  pay the  necesary aes  or charges. But benefit
txation can exist  indepndently of earmarling  and vice versa. Thus benefit  txion  may be
added  to the cental consolidated  resources  or revenues  may be assiged for expendiur  or
activiies that do not yield identfiable benefits  for the contributing  taxpayers. But the same
principles  and considerations  are applicable  in regard  to the  earmarking  of govenment  or public
sector loans for developmental  and infrastcture  puposes in contst  to general-purpose
borowing for ways  and means  or current  expendis.  A com  dbleeple  of earmarked
loans for in  are the railway  and state electricity  bonds  in ldia.  The proceeds  of
govemment  lotties  also lend themselves  to utilization  for specific  social  in  items
such as hcspitals,  sports stadia  etc.  The earmarking  of taxes and loans is an established  and16
growing  fiscal technique  for finance of infrastructure  projects  and activities. An interesting
extension  of the earmarking  principle  to the sphere  of public sector contactual saving  is the
creation of a 4 billion peso loan fund by the Philippines  social security  system targeted to
Philippine  power  projects  and administered  by local banks. This fund is empowered  to extend
fifteen  year loans  of up to 200 million  pesos  to a bank, which  then  on-lends  to the power  project
company. The banks  handle  appraisal  and monitoring,  and they can also  leverage  the funds  by
adding other resources.  The soial  secrty  systm  thus assumes only the bank nskL
Intenational insurance  companies  in the Philippines  now can also make  infasc  loans  of
up to fiften  years with the approval  of the Insurance  Commissioner. In sum the scope and
potential  for  urhe  development  of infrastrucure  finance  merits serious  consideraton  in light
of its budgetary  modalities  and its micro-and  macroecono  implications.
Ermarking may be authorized  either through  spec  consuional  provisions  as in
several Central American countres  and  Brazil, or  by  specific  legislation.  Consttional
provision  for earmarking  is usually  for broad  based  social  infstuctur  items  lie  educaion  (as
in  Costa Rica) rather than for economic  infrastructure ike public utlities which is more
appropriately  handled  through  enactment  of legislation  by majority  vote. Consequently,  statutory
proision  offers much greater flexibility  to cope wnth  varying fiscal objectives  relatively  to
constitutional  provision which is necessarily  more rigid and cumbersome  and ill-suited  for
flexible budget  managementr Earmrknyg is particularly widesread  in Latin America but
is also  used in several  Asian  counies  (e.g. Japan,  Korea,  the Philippines  and Thailand)  in the
form of special  accounts,  whereas  it is rather  limited  in the  Francophone  countries  and even  less
so in the British type of budgetary  systems. Typically,  earmarking  is used in infas17
finance through highway funds and betterment  levies to finance local expenditure  as n  te  very
extensive earmarking programs in Columbia and Turkly (McCleary, 1991).
That  earmainag is  widespread is  no assurance of its  econoic  merits which have
therefore to be carefully evaluated.  The arguments for and against earmarling have been the
subject of  ehaustive  debate by  economits  (Adam Smith, Wicsll,  Lindahl, Samuelson,
Musgrave,  James  Buchanan)  and  more  recently  in a review  of World  Bank  cxience  MdCeary
(1991). The case for earmarking  has been extensively  argued  by Dean (1965),  Bird (1982),
and Teja (1988). Briefly,  its advantages  are as follows:
(a)  It applies  the benefit  principle  of taxation  and provides  a direct
link betwee  costs and benefits; and by linng  taxato  with
spending  it offers a mecham  to overcome  resistance  totaxes and
facilitates  generation  of new sources of tax revue.  It carries the
assrance  to tapayers  that taxes will be spent in their locality or
region, and thereby helps improve tax compliance.
(b)  It  inates  infuc  funds  from leglative  and politcal
vagaries  by obviating  periodic  haggling  withn the bureaucracy  or
betw  the executive  and the legislatur  It provides assuAnce of
greate stability  and continuity  of funding  and thereby  of seedy
execution  of projects  and of essential  maintance.  For efficient1i
isucture services  the size  as wel as the continuity  of funding
are equally  important.
(c)  At  the  macreconomic leti,  eamang  helps  to  insulate
infrasructure  investment in  the  event  of  o
adjustment  programs,  which  usually  tend  to 
dsrortonately  on infrastuctue  expenditu  with minimal
redutoio of currnt  expendite  on pubLic  sectr  employment  and
wages. An earmarng  clau  helps  streng  the autho  hand
in reducing  non-prority public  exenditure.
As against  these  arguments,  several  objections  are advanced  agaist  earmarkizg. The
ae objection  is that earmarkng undermines  the principle  of a unified  budget designed  to
cate revenues without a  onet-one  o  oence  of  taxes and benefits.  It  might
ceivably  lead to a misallocation  of resources  into earnared  ues  at the expense  of non-
marked  uses and hamper  effective  budgetary  control  and generaly infinge the discrein  of
executive.  Earmarlkd  funds  are also said  to promote  an  enclave  mentality in the managers
such fnds  and could conceivably  lea1 to oveit  in specific  sectos, as in the case
gasoline  taes  for highways  in New Zealand  which  resulted  in a conseqal  reduction  in
markied  funds tPremchand  1989,  p. 160). On the other hand, in countres like Colombia,  it
1 be argued that the expansion  of earmarked  taxes should  be viewed as a reaction to the
ceedigly cumberome and inefficient  budgetary  and expenditre systems  (Bird, 1982).19
But hes  objections,  while legitimate,  do not undermine  the basic rtionale for
earmarldng.  First,  these objections assume th  earmarked  revenues are  a disproportionate
segment  of public revenues  which is not in fact the case. Secondly,  the arguments  against
earmarking  assume  that general  fund financing  would  necessarily  eliminate  the drawbacks  of
earmarking. This is questionable  in as much  as geeral  fud  financing  is done  incrementally
from given  levels  rate  than on a zero-base  budgetng  procedure  that evaluates  each tax and
qpenditure  item  afresh  year  to year. Moreover,  there  are ways  and means  to reduce  budgetary
rigidity  though perodic adjustmeats  to the base  or rate of earmarked  funds. Lkwise,  there
could be provision for joint financing of infuastrucue  items through earmarled and geneal
revenues, with the latte providing  the necessary  latuWde  for discrionary  dhanges  at the margin.
Earmarking, like any other fiscal tchnique  has its uses and abuses but these can be
controlled  trough  perodic rview  and efficieny audits. With due safeguards, it can serve as
an apprprate instument of ifras  finance. Ideally,  earmarldng  should  aim at coverng
maintenance  exnditure  while  pital should  compete  with other investment  poties  in the
budgetary  process. The rationale  for this  dinction  is that  mantenance  has  to cover  sunk  costs
and  ovide  for mnimum  standards  of service;  undr  nance  creates  serious  bottenecks  and
adds disproportiotely to total costs in the long run.  Earmarking  for maintenance  makes  it
easier  to fit in with incremental  budgetng whereas  capital  items  mert a zero-base  approach.
The successful  expence  of the Road  Fund in Ghana  typifies the net advantes  of
earmarking. Due to a long history  of neglect,  only  30 percent  of Ghana's  road network  was
considered  in good  condition  in the mid-1980s.  Much  of the netwoxk  had almost  broken  down,
disupting crtical flows of traffic. As part of a program  to double  annual  road maintenance20
expenditre  from $20 million  to $40 milLion,  a road fund  was set up in 1985. Besdes being
low in relation  to the needs,  maintenance  funds  were subject  to budgetary  delays  in approval  and
release,  which  disrupted  planning  and execution.  The Fund sources  include:  (a) a special  road
fund  levy, which  is a part of the fuel tax and contributes  about  90 percent  of the resources;  (b)
vehicle  examinaton  and driver  liensig  fees;  and (c)  tolls  on fourtee bridges,  four ferries,  and
the Accra-Tema  Road. The fund  itself  was  expected  to contribute  only  about  30 percent  of the
total  cost  of maintenance,  with  another  15 percent  coming  from  regular  budgetary  sources,  and
the .emaining  55 percent  from fte  DA  and international  donors  which  was to decline  later. In
practice, however, regular budgetary fimds have not always materialized,  despite being in the
"super-coe  budget.  The Road Fund, which is functionally  a road  t  fund is
dedicated  to road maintenance  done  by contractors'  (with  a mino exception)  which  ensures  that
it is not used for other purposes  Despite  initial  difficulties,  the fund is regarded  as highly
successful  by government  agencies,  maintance contractors,  and  the general  public  who  see  the
benefits  from road menance.  The budgetary  nties  have been greatly reduced.
Greater  certnty,  in turn, has enabied  effective  competitive  bidding  for maintenance  contracts,
lowenng  unit costs  as well as boostig the  construction  industry  in Ghana In additon,  reliable
domestic  funding  has aaed  intnational matching  funds (Thomas  Pankaj,  World  Bank).
Tnstitutifonat  Framework of Infrastructure  EiqDao
On the institutional  side, the key issue is the assigment of infrast  ture provision
resWonsibilities  among different jurisdictions  (Central, State, Municipal)  wbich must be
appropriaely  matched  by the assignment  of revenues  since tax revenues, such as property,21
vehicle  and fuel tx  are most  efficiently  collected  at the local or provincial  levels, while:  road
user charges  are often most  efficiendy  coliected  at the provincial  or central  level (e.g. inational
highways).  It  is necessary  and desirable  to have efficient and equitable  revenue-sharing
arrangements  concurrently  with optimal  mobilization  of local tax potential,  in order to ensure
that fiscal  decenazation  does not affect the equity or the criteria of maitenance of equal
minimum  levels  of infrAstructure  services  in the country. A major  issue is in the allocation  of
inter-governmental loan  funds  and  gants  and  the  reconciliation of  the 'needs'  of  each
jurisdiction with 'performance' criteria (e.g. ability to collect taxes and local funds).
Ihe Role  of Mufl  Fina
Since a substantial  segment  of infrastructure  lile roads, watrwork,  sewerage,  waste
disoa,  urban developnt,  and public transit, is witiin the jusdicton  of local and civic
authorits,  the  role of municipal  finance  (axes and  bormwings)  in constrcion and maintenance
Of in  is critcal.  The principal  and most elastic  sources  of municipal x revenues
are the urban property  and automotive  taution.
Urban popet  taxes.  The recurnt  tax on real property (land, improvemets,
buildings)  is  a widely used source of  municipal  revenue in developing  counties,  whose
contribudon to  tax  revenues varies  between 8 to  90  percent in  major metolitan  cities
(Dillinger,  1988,  p. 3).  It is  cost effeeve because  its base is geographically  wide, and faces
no direct  competition  with the tax bases  of higher  levels  of government;  and the benefits  of the
services  it finances  remns  wthin the taing jurisdiction. Given  the trend  ard ubanizaon,
it offers  an elastic  source  of revenue. But despite  its ments on ground  of economy,  efficiency22
and equity,  its full  potential  has not been  exploited,  and real revenues  have  fallen,  especially  in
some  of the high-inflation  economies,  reflecting  political  and administrative  difficulties,  such  as
the scarcity  of technical  expertise  in assessment  and coltection. Some  countries  like Brazil  and
Malaysia  have set up a  centrl  valuation  agency which has been found effective.  More
fundamental  reforms  have  also been  implemented  in Bazil to maintain  revenues  which  include
periodic reviews  of valuation  based on readily observable  property characteristics  and the
extension  of tax liability  to any person  in beneficial  occupation  of property  thereby  relieving
municipalities  of any legal obligation  to find  legal  ownership  before  imposing  the tax.
Motorveicltaxation. The ownership  and use of motor vehicles 'represents an
excllent but much  neglected  tax base  for  urban  governments  in developing  counties" (Bahl  and
Linn,  p. 191)  in as much  as the number  of vehicles  typically  grows  faster  than the popuation  in
urban areas and the incidence  of the tax is liely  to fall on person with higher incomes.
However,  it should  be treated as complementary  to any higher-level  government  taxation  of
vehicles  to recover  apprm  ately (through  fuel, sales,  and License  taxes)  the maintenane  costs
and some of the capital  costs of roads and arguably  to tax luxury cars at a higher  rate as a
tchnique of income  redistribution.  it can  be supplemented  by parking  fees  both  as a source  of
revenue  and as an instrument  of congestion  pricing.
MudQ-W  boffowinLr.  Few municipal  authorities  have  the creit  to iue  bonds  either
domestic  or foreign,  and only exceptional  municipal  authorities  (Jurong  Town  Corporation  in
Singapore  and the greater  Ankara  Municipality  in Turkey)  have  isued  ationa  bonds.
In practice,  te  requirements  of municpal  finance  stretch  beyond  their  tax and  borrowing
potential  and have to be met by transfers  from central  and state authorites and recourse  to23
municipal  funds  and inmediaries.  Spcfic purpose  tansfers from the cental to fte state  and
local authionrtes  usually  lack  any objective  criteia and transfers  of grants are distributed  in an
ad hoc manner purely at the discretion  of  the Central Government  like the 'convenios'
(negotiated  transfers)  in Brzil  (Anwar  Shah, 1991,  p.71 and Table 2.3).
Mulnipi  unds.  Intermediares and lntstructure  %arlr
An important  source  of infrastructure  finance  is Mucipal  Development  Funds (MDFs)
and  Municipal  Development  Intemediaries  (DuIs) (Kenneth  Davey, 1988). Although  there  are
several  variants  of MDF, MDI, and infrastructure  banks, they are based on some common
models  and ;aditions as follows:
(1)  Revolving  loan funds  for  local authorities,  which  ar  responsible  to ministries  of
local government,  are typical  of Anglophone  countries  such  as Kenya,  Sri  Lanka,
Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.  The funds operate at a layer of
authority above that of the individual  municipality  for investment  in urban
infrastrucatre,  trough  municipal  subsidiares.
(2)  'Windows' for grants  and  loans  to municipal  istucture  ('Fonds d'Equipment
Communal')  operated  by national 'Caisse de Prets' managing  state controlled
pension, insurance,  and savings  funds. These  are common  in the Francophone
stales of North and West Africa.
(3)  Autonomous  institutions  (for example,  banks, sectaats,  and assocations)  for
municipal  finance (Instuto  de Fomento Municipal  or  bnstuto  para Desarrollo
Municipal)  developed,  often  with USAID  assistance,  in several  Latin Amercan24
counti-Bolivia,  Colombia,  Costa  Rica, Guatemala,  Paraguay,  and Venezuela
for example.  Thes  bodies  are deigned to supply technical  assistance  and
training  as well as loan finance. It has been common  for them to desip  and
build municipal  water supply  and seweage systems  directy, handing  them over
to municipal  enteWrises  for opeation and debt service. This  may  also  be viewed
as an interesting  variant  of the BOT technique  at the local  leveL
(4)  Specialized  infrast  e  finance  institutions  which  include  development  bank
dedicated  to infstructure  finance,  such  as BANOBRAS  in Mexico. Although
traditional  development  banks  also  combine  inmfastuctre finance  wnth  their  main
industrial  finance  business  BANOBRAS  provides short tenr loans for public
works against  contactors'  rceivables as well as providing  Up  to 25 percent  of
the fill cost  of a project  finance  start-up  oosts.
(5)  New  types  of inras  funds  have  also  emerged  as catalytic  or tansiional
fincing  like the Prvate Sector  Energy  Development  Fund in Pakis  and the
Ptivate  Sector  Energy  Fund  in Jamaica,  and the Regonal  Development  Account
(RDA)  in Indoiiesia,  which  is designed  to shift  financing  of infrstucture projects
from government  grants  to debt  instruments.  RDA  lends  at near-market  rates  for
three to five years  to demonstae adequate  financial  capability  to enable  clents
to borrow  diecUy from  the capital  market  or financil institions.  In India the
new and innovative  Ifrastctu  Leasing  and Fincial  Services  and the moe
traditional  Housing  and urban Development  Corporation  aim to sel their loans25
to ote  private financial institutions  once project cost histories have been
established.
Historically,  few of these institutions  and funds have shown  a capcity  for sustained
investnent on the scale needed  because  of under capitalizaton,  poor fimancial  discipline  and
substantial  arrars.  While  they have  added  to the stock  of urban  infrastructure,  they have  done
little  to promote  the cpacty  or commitment  of municipalities  to operate  or expand  it effectively
or  to recover costs.  A noteworthy  exception  is Colombia's successfid  municipal credit
institution,  the Financiera  de Desavvollo  Teritorial (FINDETER),  an autonomous  agency  under
the Fiance Ministry,  which  has been  relatively  insuaed from political  pressures. It is financed
by market bonds, recycling of its credits, and foreig  finance, bilateral and multlatl.  It
rediscomts co  bank loans to municipal  infast  projects.  Between  1975 and
1990,  more than 1300  projects  with  a value  of more  than $1 billion,  assisting  600 mulities.
Its success  is attributable  to the quality  of its staff  and  ihat  of the intermediaries  through  which
it leads.
Another  notably  succful  autonomous  municipal  finance  agency  is the Jordan  Cities  and
Villages  Development  Bank  (CVDB  established  in 1979)  which  povide  investment  fiance  to
municipal  and village  councils  for infrastructure  (exdluding  the greater Amman  Municiality)
on the basis of its financial  and technica appraisaL  The bank  has played  a key role in financing
the spread of physical and social infrstructure in virtually all setements  as well as in
maintaining  and improving  the quality of infrstructure investment  through  its apprais  and
monitoing (WDR  1988,  p. 164).26
The  judgenent about  what  is an optimal  distribution  of municipal  finance  between  taxes,
loans and grants and between  different  types of infrastructure  taxation,  depends  in the final
analysis,  on a combination  of critria  including  economic  and administraive  efficiency  and
equity,  both horizontal  (including  regional  balance)  and vertical  (between  income  and property
groups)  and the policy  objectives  of different  layers  of govemment. A suggestive  model  for
efficient  assignment  of municipal  revenue  autiority by type  of infrastructure  is set out  in Chart
1.
P  stFiann  of I
The conventional  wisdom  that only the public sectr  can supply  and finance  public
ves  in developing  countries  is refuted  by the not  insignificant  segments  of pnvate  provision
of public  seices  in these  countries,  many  of whom  have  a natural  or spontaneous  private  sector
in i  r  which  exists  independently  of the subsequent  policy-induced  privatized  public
sector  (Gabriel  Roth, 1987). Private  financing  needs  to be fostered  to reduce the burden  on
govemment  finances  as well  as to encourage  better  risk sharing,  accountabilit, monion  and
management  in infrastructure  provision.  ft has the same, or even more potent, effect as
eaumaring in insulating  infrastucture  from political  or budgetary  vicissitudes,  an aspect  often
overlooked  by even  proponents  of pivatization.
The  pnvate  provison and the conomiitant  financing  of public  services  tks  a varety of
forms  of which  the basic prototypes  are as follows:27
Chart 1: Efficient  Assignment  of Municipal  Revenue  Authority  By Type Of infrastruchre
Infrstruct  ILocal  Taxes  User  ITranse  I  Borrwings
Services  [  and Fees  j  Charges
Public  Uflihies
Water  Supply  S  |  P  _  _  A
Sewerage  S  ____A_
Drainage  P  P  ______  A
Electricity  _P  A
Telephones  _  P  A
land Development  P  A
Transporation
HIighways  and  Streets  P  P  _  _  A
Public  Transit  s  j  P  j_I  (A)
General  Urban Services
Refuse  Collection  P
Waste  Dispoa  P  .,  s, 
Pdmary  -Source
S  =  Secondary  Source
A  =  borowing is appropriate  for major  capital  expenditur
(A)  =  borrowing  is appropriate  for capital spending,  but liklly to account  for small
share  of total spending.
Development  charges (e.g. special  assessments,  valorization  charges, betement  levies) are
appropriae  for  drainage,  highways,  and steets, especially  when  their  beefits are geographically
well defined within a jurisdiction. Upfront  capital  contributions  from developers  are also a
subset.
1  (from central  government,  shares  of national  taxes, like VAT and donors)
Source: This chart is a modified version of Table 3-2 in Bahl and Linn (1992, p.71).2S
1)  CQW=  from  abml  n
Whme  one government  agency  is responsible  for an entire sector, some  activities  are
contracted  out to private  firms, e.g. road main  e  azil, Costa  Rica, India, Zaire)
or laying  of telephone  lines  (Linia,  Peru).
2)  Monooly Fianchises
Where  a private  company  can  be apponted  by a public  authority  to provide  sevices on
a monopoly  basis at specified  standards  and long-term  tariffs  (20-30  years) because  of
the longevity  of the equipment  (e.g. water  supply  in many  West  African  counties). The
franchised  company  also undertakes  the necessary  investment. Franchises  are not too
common  but can  be found  in bus tranport (Hong  Kong,  Nairobi);  electicity (Barbados,
Cayman  lands), Guayaquil (Ecuador), Manila; telecommunications  (Dominican
Republic).  Franchising,  however,  is not necessarily  monopolistic  (e.g. competing  taxi
ompanies  may be fanchised in the same  area).
3)  Mnmet  Contracts
In this  arangement,  the agency  owns  and retains  responsibility  for  the service  but
aranges for private  management  (e.g. the Botswana  telephone  service  managed
by Cable  and Wireless  PLC).
4)  Consumer  Ct￿pnatiY
These are autonomous,  voluntary  organiations which distribute  surpluses  in
proportion  to the member's  purchases and are well desgned to function  in
monopoly  sitations (e.g. supply  of village  electrcity)  wherein  consumers  cannot
benefit  fiom  competition  among  suppliers.  Electrical  cooperatves  are widespread29
in tie Philippines  but are also  operative  in several  other  countries  such  as Brazil,
Chile, Costa Rica, Nicaragua,  India, Indochina,  and Bangadesh.
The experience  of the Yemen  Arab  Republic  shows  that the private  sector  can supply  the
bulk  of electricity  (about  two-thirds)  even  in one of the poorest  countries  with  a difficult  terrain.
The progressive  increase in private financing  of electricity  was largely due to village level
initiatives  financed  by migrats'  remittances  from abroad,  supplemented  by assistance  from the
government  and the Confederation  of Yeneni  Development  Assocaons.  Private  infrasture
finance is  proportionately  greater in Lati  Amenca than m  other regions and larger in
telecommunications  and electic power generation. But even with the rsig  share of pnvate
infrastructure  finance,  governments  will continue  to be an important  source of infras  ftrc
finance  (WDR, 1994,  Box 5.7).
The choice  between  the different  modes  of private  financig would  depend, given the
politcal will, on the development  of  specialized  infastructure finance, growth of private
entrereneurship, strength  of non-governmental  or  s  and, notably,  the availability  of
contactor  finance.
Qmntmao  Finance Its Cntical Iwom=o  for Private  Inftusm=  E'ina
The efficency of managemen  and similar  contacts is an importat determinant  of the
viabiliq of private financing  of the infratucture  especially  in the constuction sector for
infastrucure (water  supply,  transport, rition,  power,  etc.) which  accounts  for between  3-8
percent  of a developing  country's  GDP. The  improvement  of domestic  construction  capacity  and30
capability is crucial for the maintence  of basic infrastructure "and it is geneay  expensive,
if not impossible,  to bring  foreign  contractors  back  again  for this type of work"  which  involves
continuing  new  investment  in scatered small  works 'usually unsuited  for  execution  by foreign
fmis"  (World Bank, 1984, p.3).  Contractor's finance raises some special  problems which
reflecting  the low capital  base of firms, the uncertinty of cash flows, absence  of bankable
collateral,  fluctutons in demand  which  together  restrict  access  to commercial  banks. Even  the
furishing of bank  performance  bonds  and guarantees  by contractors  is difficult  because  these
further reduce  the same  collateal which  the contractors  use for funding. Typically,  banks  do
not dscount  more than 60 percent of  the value of payment certificates  by govemment
departments.  The  frequent  delays  in payments  by public  authories which  can be as high up to
eight months (n Colombia  prior to 1980)  compound  the inherently  diffiult finaia  position
of contractors, who therefore are obliged to resort to high interest rat  informal  finance.  The
financing requirements of  the  constuction  industry  can  be  partally  met  through local
Development  Finance  Companies  (DFC)  who  lend  funds  to contractors  for highways  and similar
civil works )e.g. Ethiopia, Ghana and Palistan). But the bulk of  the basic finance will
necessarily  bave to  be  provided  through  domestic  sources  such  as  special  institutions for
construcfion  finace  like the BANOBRAS  of Mexico  which, since  its inception  in 1933,  has
helped  the Mexican  industry  "become  one of the more developed  in the world"  (World  Bank,
1984,  p.77) by prviding short-tenm  loans  to public  works  aginst conators  receivables  from
the government  agency  sponsoring  the prqjecL It also  operates  as part of its trust actvities a
special  fund that can  provide  up to 25 percent  of the full value  of a project,  which is used to
finance  the stat-up costs  of conruction.  But a special  institution  is justfied only  if the value31
of business  warants it and if the concomitant  technical  and manageial capability  is available
as is proved  by the  expe  ce of a  similar  institution  in an African  country  set up to fnance
indigenous  contactors which  has failed  to produce  positive  results  due to inadequate  funding,
lack of entrepreneurial  vocation  and management  ability. In such  conditions,  a more  practical
alternative  would be to develop  and improve  existing  commercial  and a development  banldng
channels rather than the creation of a new financial institution.  In addition, government
authorties can take  remedial  measures  to ease the cash flow  problems  of contractors  through
more frequent  advance  and progress  payments  with specific  provision  for accruing  interest at
commercial  rates for the overdue  period.  The latt  proision  can be justified only if it is
generalized  to cover all overdue  payments  from government  to the private sector.
Joint  nancingPxatznL  mlagc
The policy choces are not resticted to either public or prvate finaing.  If outrght
sales  of infuctue  are not financially  or polically feasible,  significant  gains  can  be realized
by allowing  state-owned  enterprises  to opate  like a private  firm by recourse  to management
contract, leases or concessions.
In management  contracts,  the govemment  pays  aprivate company  a fee for managin tf
eneprse.  Such contacts are more common  in hotels, airlines  and agrculture, but are less
frequent  in the industrial  and infrasuct  sectors.  Mnagement contracts  are flat fee for
service  arrangements,  payable  regardless  of profits  and consequently  do not provide  incentive
for improving  efficiency.  The opeating losses are borne by the owner (the state).  The
drawbacks  of management  contacts can be largely  overcome  by leases  under  which  the private32
party, which pays fte govemment  a fee to use the assets, assumes  the commec  risk of
OPeation  and m  tnce  and thus offers  greater  incentives  to reduce  costs. Fees are usually
linked  to performance  and profits. Management  angements  have  been  widely  used  in Africa
for infirastructure  e.g. water supply  in Guinea  and CMte  d'Ivoire;  electricity  (C8te  d'Ivoire);  road
trasport  (Niger),  port management  (Nigeria). In each  case, the contacting firm was a joint
forein-local ventre with the foreign  partner  bringing  in essential  expertise.
Under  concessions,  the builder  is responsible  for capital  expendius  (unlk  a lessee).
Such concessions  have been successfully  employed in the puivatzation of  railways and
telecommunications  in Argentina.
In  the absence  of any systematic  analyses  of the exeienc  of private management
constacts  it is difficult  to draw any definitve conclusions  about the utility of such contracts.
They usually  do not bring about ft icreased  investment  that is a major accomplishment  of
changes in ownership  and are, terefore,  best regarded as  a halfway house towards full
pxivatzation.
Le=  Finance  for  n-ifrastucture
Another  usefiul  vehile  for paal  private  financing  for infrastucture is lease finance.
Leasing through speialized  companies  is filrly widespread  in the developing  countries  and most
of these compaie  have performed  well (prstiularly in Korea and Malayia) and in some
countries  (Thailand,  Sri  Lanlca,  Korea,  Porugl,  Pakistn, Brazil,  Peru) IFC has  effected  partial
or total divesttures which  have  generally  yielded  high rates of retun.  Most companies  have33
maintained  balanced  portfolios  with transportation,  construction,  serices and manuf  ing
sectors  all well represented  (IFC, 1988,  p.17)
As leasing  is closely  linked to capital  formation  it has high potentiai  in infrastrucure
finance. Commercial  leasing  of heavy  equipment  is very expensive  and leasing  is therefore  an
atrctive  option.  Financial  leasing is a useful channel  for the acquisition  of equipment,
particularly  for civil works  contractors,  in as much  as large down payments  are not required;
monthly  installments  are tax  deductible,  and  there  is usually  an option  to purchase  the equipment
upon  compleion of the loan period  (usually  3 to 4 years). Staaight  hire is usually  applied  for
equipment  which  the contractor  requires  only  for  a short  period. Hiring  contacts can  also  take
the form of a subcontact under  which  the supplier  rents the equipment  with  the opeatr  and
provides  fuel, lubricants  and sevces.  Even  large  foreign  contractors  use  to get
strted on large  projects. Another  channel  for maling  eqwpment  available  to contrators is for
the govemment  department  concerned  to provide  it on hire.  A good  example  of this is in the
State  of Bihar  (India)  where  the contctors pay the opeators directly  for  all operating  expenses
and to carry out tepairs  through  commercial  firms  (if the goverment fails to carry them  out),
while deducting  the cost of repairs from the rntals  due to the government This system  is
pariculady suitable  in cases where large goverment equpment Les idle whie, at the same
time,  contractors  lack the capital  needed  to acquire  equipment  (Woild  Bank, 1984).
The Informal  Einu  of Infrasmucture
The foregoing  analysis pertains to the provion  of  voluntary private finance of
infrastrucr  through channels  and instiutions of formal  finance, but ther  is also a not34
inconsideable  actual  and potential  role for  informal  financing  of infrastructure  in the  developing
countries.
The so-called  informal  and semi-formal  financial  sector in developing  countries  has
attracted considerable  attention  in recent years in the context of its role in financing  the
noncorporate  private  sector  (Chandavarkar,  1987:  World  Bank,  1989,  pp. 112-117)  but  its acual
and potential  role  in the financing  of infrastructure  has  been  much  less discussed  partly  because
of a belief that the informal sector  does not lend itself easily to finance  public spirited  and
collective  activities.  But, there is now growing evidence at  informal local community
associations  in low-income  countres have been able to successfully  finance  projects  sucih  as
roads and sewerage  and even schools and health care failities with no support from any
govemment  agency  by usig  systems  of informal  utation (including  taxation  in kind  in the form
of labor  contributions)  as in the Orangi  district  of Karachi  (Paldsan)  and in Lima (Peru)  (Bird,
199*,  pp. 6-7). Such  projects  exemplify  the  potential  for mobilizing  local  savings  through  extra
legal laws" (de Soto, 1989)  to saisfy local demand  for small-scale  infras  projects  that
are not met by formal  government  institutions. In Lima (Peru) it is reported  that informal
suppliers  provide  93 percent  of urban  mass  transit  facilities  (enkins, 1988,  p.20).  But the full
effectiveness  of such  projects,  nevertheless,  depends  ultimately  on the coopeation  of the formal
civic authorities  as is well exemplified  by the expeiene  of the otherwise  successful  Oangi
Prtoject  in Karachi  whose "main  problem  has been the failu  of the formal  city governmt
adequately to  maintain the  centl  sewerage system" (Bird,  1994, p.6).  This, in  fact,
underscors the lon  that the efficacy  of infonmal  infrastructure  finance  and operations  is
conditional  upon the apprpriate support  of the formal  infastrut  There is, therefore,  a35
strong  complementarity  between  the  informal  and  formal  infrastructure  sectors,  and  public  policy
should  aim at strengthening  the linkages  between  the two sectors. The informal  sector  cannot
survive  as an enclave. Moreover,  user-financed  infrastructre can  operate  successfully  only in
the formal  sector. Insofar  as development  occurs  pnmarily  in the informal  sector,  as in squatter
settlements,  less formal  mechanisms  must  be used to opeate any beneficiary-related  finance.
Conclusions:  Toward  a Polycentric  and Pluralist  Agenda
Any viable  and realistic  agenda  for bridging  the financing  gap of needed  infrastructure
investment  has to take  due account  of the fact that the bulk of infrastructure  finance  will have
to be from  domestic  sources,  public  and  private. But  it is not merely  the size  of available  funds
but  the Tegularity  of  their  flows that is  central to  the maintenance  of  infrastructure.
Inrastructure  finance,  however,  will  have  to compete  in a level  playing  field  with  other  sectors.
Any essential, but not open-ended,  subsidies  for maintiing  universal  minimum  standards  of
service  are best carried  on the government  budget  subject  to periodic  review.
A viable program  of financing  need infrastructure  investment  has to be predicated  on
appropriate institutional  reform to  provide for  an  optimal division of  resources and
responsibilities  between  all layers  of government,  Central  and State,  and  the local  authorities  and
on specific  mechanisms  of insumng infrastructure  finance  from budgetary  and other  pressures
through  eannarling,  privatiaton, and objecdtve  criteria  for shaing of national  mxes  lihke  VAT.
A conspicuous  lacuna  in most developing  countries  is the absence  of a national  infrastructure
agency,  e.g. on the lines of Mexico's  BANOBRAS.  to fund and coordinate  with appropriate
technical  assistance  for infrastructure  projects. Such  a national  agency  would  also fimction  as36
an apex  institution  for municipal  finance  intermdiaris,  whose  cation  and improvement  should
be  accorded due  priority by  national authorities.  The replicable expiec  of  such
intermediaries  in Colombia  and  Jordan  is particularly  instructive.  If the craion  of a specialzed
agency  is not regarded  as feasible  or desirable,  the  creation  of special  windows  for  infrastructure
finance  in national  development  banks  should  be considered  as a viable  option. Bven  such  an
agency  will need to operate  in the context  of a National  Jndicative-but  not dirigist-Plan for
Infrastrucure that can map out the prospective  sources  and uses of infrastuc  finance  by
sector  as in Japan. One of its prime responsibilitis  would  be to detemine the indispensable
import-content  (equipment,  technical  and managerial  expertise)  of infastructure  finance  in order
to avoid eexcess  borrowing.
Privatzation of inftructure  too should  also be viewed as an implicit  eamiarling
mechanism  for iffinane  but, equally,  ofical  regulation  of public  utility  prc  and
rates  of retum  has to afford  adequate  scope  for  generating  retained  earings and  thereby  promote
self-financing  of infrsre  and to adjust  for inflationary  pressures  as well  as exchange  rate
movements.
A postive policy stance  for infrastucture  finance  should  comprehend  maximizat  of
(a) cost recovery  trugh  user charges  and (b) tax potential,  particularly  at the municipal  level
since  even  the viability  of loan  finance  depends  in the final  analysis  on the efficiency  of the tax
effort  Thus, a pluralist  agenda  for infrastruck'r: finance should  comprehend  institutional
reforms  as well as an optiml combination  of user charges, aes  and loans  at market  rates of
interest37
It would  not be  riate  to conclude  that while  infraure  finance  is imponant,
it is not  always  the decisive  constraint  judging  by the oprafing losses  of even  adequately  funded
infrastuctu  projects. It has been rightly  said: 'By and large, it seems to be fte case that
where  enterpse  leads finance  follows (Joan  Robinson).
N:  Anand Chandavarkar  was a conutant  for the World Development  Rot  1994 and
prepared a background paper on Infras  ftr  Finance: Issu,  LIsttutions, and Policies, of
which  this paper is a rvised and abridged  version.38
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